Details
Excerpt of an Oral History with Frederick Nolting, former US Ambassador to Vietnam from March 15, 1961 to August 15, 1963, recorded on May 14, 1966, regarding the overthrow of the Diem government on November 1, 1963.
Transcript
During this time, beginning say in June of 1963 and carrying through until the overthrow of the Diem government on November 1, 1963, there built up, there was built up a concatenation of forces, all of which were in the direction of “well we’ve had enough of this, ah, we must, we must somehow break out of the previous policy of supporting this country through its elected government.” Certain people who had sort of been of this opinion, to a certain extent all along in Washington were given great encouragement in this line by the press and the prevailing public opinion. I think the White House got very sensitive to this. (break) There were errors on all sides in my opinion: our own Mission, the Diem government and Washington, and the thing got worse and worse. This was exacerbated by the press and the prevailing opinion that this was, in fact, a religious persecution. And that was the basic error. Now you can see certain factors here which would have a bearing on the President’s attitudes. (break)
When I got back to Washington, which was, I think, the twenty-fifth of August (Interviewer O’Connor then comments on the famous meeting that he attended upon his return). There was a series of meetings. A very, a very eventful decision had already been taken over the weekend and had been sent to my successor, Cabot Lodge. This was late August, and from then on there was a series of meetings. I think the President felt unsure about this decision, but he couldn’t find any way to retrieve it. I’m not sure he really wanted to, although he gave me the impression at times that if he could find a way to get it back on the old track, he would like to have done it. (break) Certain things had already been done which made it extremely difficult to get back on the old track. And I think President Kennedy was - found himself in a position where he thought he had to compromise on this. I don’t think he expected exactly the outcome that occurred on November 1st, 1963, although the way things were going, I expected it. I couldn’t see how knowing the situation out there as I did, I couldn’t see how the government, which we’d been supporting for eight years, could survive under the pressures that were mounted against it. In so far as the assassinations’ concerned, with members of the Vietnamese government, I don’t think they were expected - by anyone. But again, knowing the situation out there, it was difficult to believe that there could be a peaceful coup d’etat. At least it was difficult for me.